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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 718 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS-SHERMAN ACT-PATENT POOL AGREEMENTS 
WHICH R.EsTRICT FIELDS OF UsE-DeVlieg, the owner of three major patents 
in the machine tool field, licensed his inventions to several machine tool 
manufacturers. Subsequently, he and the licensees formed a new corpora-
tion, Associated Patents, Inc., a patent holding company, to which he as-
signed his patents. Each party to the agreement owned an equal share of 
API. The agreement contained provisions for the granting back to API of 
any improvement patents acquired by the parties and it also restricted the 
use of the patents by each party to carefully circumscribed fields of use. 
Held, a patent pool agreement restricting fields of use is a combination in 
restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 United 
States v. Associated Patents, Inc., (D.C. Mich. 1955) 134 F. Supp. 74. 
In cases involving patent license restrictions the courts have differenti-
ated between licenses granted by individual patentees and those granted by 
a group. Individual patent licenses are allowed to contain many restrictions 
which would be illegal if a patent interchange or cross-licensing arrange-
ment were involved.2 For example, individual license agreements providing 
for the fixing of the first sale price,S or for restrictions in fields of use,4 
have been upheld. The rationale for these decisions is that a patent grants 
the owner a limited time monopoly, and any restrictions he imposes within 
the scope of his monopoly are "reasonably within the reward" for his in-
vention.11 On the other hand, similar restrictions in cross-licensing agree-
ments and in patent interchanges have been condemned as combinations 
in restraint of trade, 6 the restraint arising not from the patent itself, but 
from the fact of combination and agreement.7 However, the courts have 
held that if the patent intercl_lange does not result in a restraint of trade, 
the existence of the combination is not illegal per se.8 Thus, a patent inter-
change may grant patent licenses which restrict fields of use and still not 
run afoul of the Sherman Act.9 But the general rule remains that patent 
126 Stat. L. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1. 
2 Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. Maytag Co., (8th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 136. 
3 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192 (1926). 
4 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Corp., 304 U.S. 175, 59 S.Ct. 116 
(1938); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 70 S.Ct. 894 
(1950). 
II United States v. General Electric Co., note 3 supra, at 489. 
6 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550 (1948); Transparent, 
Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes &: Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67 S.Ct. 610 (1947); Hartford, 
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373 (1945); United States v. New 
Departure Mfg. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 204 F. 107; Lynch v. Magnavox Co., (9th Cir. 1938) 
94 F. (2d) 883. 
7 Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale and Towne Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1909) 166 F. 555; National 
Harrow Co. v. Hench, (3d Cir. 1897) 83 F. 36; United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 
(D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 828; United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 72 
S.Ct. 350 (1952). 
8 Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S.Ct. 421 (1931); 
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 S.Ct. 9 (1912); United States 
v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 S.Ct. 473 (1918); Vulcan Mfg. Co. v. May-
tag Co., (8th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 136. 
9 Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., (9th Cir. 1949) 179 F. (2d) 80, 
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restrictions are much more likely to be declared illegal if found in inter-
change agreements rather than in individual licenses.10 The principal case 
contains elements of both an individual license and a group license. All of 
the original patents of the interchange were acquired from only one of 
the parties, DeVlieg. I£, in the absence of the interchange, he had granted 
licenses to the other machine tool manufacturers with identical restrictions, 
such licenses might very well have been upheld.11 When DeVlieg assigned 
his patents to the patent holding company, API, it might have been expect-
ed that API, as his assignee, possessed the same rights as DeVlieg12 and the 
same immunity in granting licenses with restrictive covenants that he would 
have had. However, the court in the principal case held differently. Without 
repudiating the long line of decisions which protect the individual patent 
license, the result indicates that the mere fact of combination makes the 
license agreements suspect, despite the fact that all the patents came from 
one party. This decision goes a step further than the previous patent inter-
change cases which condemned restrictive agreements made between the 
owners of several distinct patents. The i:esults may have been influenced 
by the fact that the licensing agreement contained grant-back provisions, 
so that all parties were actually contributing patents, or agreeing to con-
tribute future patents, to the pool. Whether the same conclusion would 
have been reached in the absence of the grant back provisions is arguable. 
The meaning of the case for patentees, though, is clear. When there is a 
combination of more than two patent owners granting patent licenses, the 
safest course is to license the patents to all applicants on an equal basis 
and without license restrictions.13 Failure to do so may give rise to ques-
tions of illegality under the holding of the principal case.14 
Martin F. Roston, S. Ed. 
10 Not only the licensor, but also the licensees, may be held liable for participating in 
illegal patent interchanges. United States v. General Instrument Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1949) 87 
F. Supp. 157. 
11 However, the doctrine of implied conspiracy, based on a showing of conscious 
parallelism of action, might still have led to a conviction. See United States v. Masonite 
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 S.Ct. 1070 (1942). 
12 See 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 525 (1951). 
18 Cutter Laboratories, Inc. v. Lyophile-Cryochem Corp., note 9 supra. 
14 "Even when monopoly is absent, however, licenses should be made available to every 
applicant in the industry where the participants in the interchange give up their in• 
dependent discretion to license under the interchanged patents." REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITIEE ro STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 245-246 (1955). The 
REPORT recognizes that its recommendation may go beyond the scope of previously de-
cided cases, but the principal case indicates that the courts may be willing to accept its 
position. 
